The REPLAY-MOBILE Face Presentation-Attack Database by Costa-Pazo, Artur et al.
The REPLAY-MOBILE
Face Presentation-Attack Database
Artur Costa-Pazo∗, Sushil Bhattacharjee†, Esteban Vazquez-Fernandez∗, and Sebastien Marcel†
∗GRADIANT - Galician Research & Development Center in Advanced Telecommunications
CITEXVI, loc. 14 — CUVI, 36310 Vigo (Po.) - Spain
Email: {acosta, evazquez}@gradiant.org
†Idiap Research Institute
Centre du Parc, Rue Marconi 19, PO Box 592, CH-1920 Martigny, Switzerland
Email: {sushil.bhattacharjee, sebastien.marcel}@idiap.ch
Abstract—For face authentication to become widespread on
mobile devices, robust countermeasures must be developed for
face presentation-attack detection (PAD). Existing databases
for evaluating face-PAD methods do not capture the specific
characteristics of mobile devices. We introduce a new database,
REPLAY-MOBILE, for this purpose.1 This publicly available
database includes 1, 200 videos corresponding to 40 clients.
Besides the genuine videos, the database contains a variety
of presentation-attacks. The database also provides three non-
overlapping sets for training, validating and testing classifiers for
the face-PAD problem. This will help researchers in comparing
new approaches to existing algorithms in a standardized fashion.
For this purpose, we also provide baseline results with state-
of-the-art approaches based on image quality analysis and face
texture analysis2.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although face recognition is now considered fairly mature
technology, in terms of usability and performance [1], [2], it
remains a subject of active research. Vazquez-Fernandez et
al. [3] have published a recent survey of the open problems
in facial authentication on mobile devices. One of the most
significant road-blocks to wide acceptance of facial authen-
tication technology on mobile devices is the lack of robust
countermeasures against spoof attacks. At present, the problem
of face presentation attack detection (PAD), commonly called
face anti-spoofing, is attracting considerable research interest
[4].
State of the art face-PAD methods achieve low error perfor-
mance on current datasets [5], [6]. However, as the high error
rates in cross database tests show [7], the performance depends
on the use-case. This lack of generalization becomes critical in
the space of mobile devices. The quality of presentation attack
instruments (PAI) (i.e., mobile devices, printers, monitors,
3D scanners, etc.) is also keeping pace with Moore’s Law3.
This implies not only that new methods for PAD need to be
1This work was partially supported by GAIN, Axencia Galega de Inno-
vacio´n, Consellerı´a de Economı´a, Emprego e Industria, Xunta de Galicia
(IN809A. December 30, 2014), EU H2020 project TeSLA, and by the Swiss
Center for Biometrics Recognition and Test.
2Source-code for experiments reported in this paper are available via the
link: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.paper.BioSig2016 ReplayMobile
3The quality of digital products – speed, resolution, etc. – is expected to
double roughly every 18 months.
developed, but also that new datasets should be generated for
realistic testing scenarios.
Well known databases, such as REPLAY-ATTACK [8] or
CASIA [9], still extensively used for evaluating new face-PAD
methods, are no longer representative of the technology in
current mobile devices. Given that the success of a presentation
attack (PA) depends strongly on the technology used for
face presentation and acquisition, there is a clear need for
continuously updating face-PAD databases to keep up with
the fast-paced technological advances in the mobile arena. A
modern database should consist of high resolution genuine
videos and attacks, presented as well as recorded, using mobile
devices.
We present here the REPLAY-MOBILE database for face-
PAD experiments. The database consists of 1, 200 video clips
of photo and video attack attempts, by 40 clients, under
various lighting conditions. To create an evaluation benchmark
that matches the current requirements and usage of mobile
devices, the database has been collected based on three guiding
principles.
1) Sequences are captured on representative mobiles de-
vices using the frontal camera. Both, tablets (iOS) and
smartphones (Android) are used to represent the current
spectrum of mobile devices.
2) During recording, clients hold the device in the same
way as they would do in a real scenario.
3) Attacks are performed using high resolution videos pre-
sented on a matte screen (to avoid specular reflections)
and high-quality prints on matte paper.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• a new database (REPLAY-MOBILE) which provides real-
istic test scenarios for the development of new face-PAD
algorithms specifically for mobile devices;
• two sets of face-PAD results, one based on image-quality
measures (our baseline), and the other based on texture-
analysis; and,
• erformance results reported using newly standardized ISO
metrics (see the ISO/IEC 30107-3 standard4).
4https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:30107:-1:ed-1:v1:en
Structure of this paper: following a brief summary of
related research in Section II, we introduce the REPLAY-
MOBILE database, and it associated protocols in Section III.
The two face-PAD approaches tested on the new database are
described in Section IV, and the corresponding experimental
results are presented in Section V. At the end, our conclusions
are summarized in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
We restrict our context to research in the area of (uni-modal)
face-PAD. Several publicly available databases are commonly
used to evaluate and compare face-PAD methods. This section
provides a brief overview of face-PAD approaches, and the
relevant databases.
A. Face-PAD Approaches
Face-PAD methods are usually grouped into three cate-
gories, namely, methods based on motion, liveness, and texture
[10], [11]. Here we propose a simpler taxonomy, based on
two categories: liveness detection based on motion cues, and,
image-quality based approaches. Some methods, such as that
proposed in [12] and [13] do not fall neatly into one of these
two categories, and may be considered as hybrid approaches.
Motion has long been considered an important cue for
detecting presentation-attacks. For example, a strong corre-
lation between the estimated optical flow for the face-region
and that for the background, is an indicator of a PA [14].
This approach is particularly useful in detecting printed-photos
attacks. Clearly, it is not straightforward to extend this idea to
video-attacks [12].
Local motion cues, characterizing voluntary or involuntary
movements of the face, such as head and lip movements,
have been frequently used in face-PAD applications. Several
heuristics have been developed for detecting eye-blinks [15].
Pinto et al. [12] treat each video as a 3D data-set (instead
of a sequence of 2D frames) and compute a number of
statistical descriptors over this data. Interestingly, this method
can also characterize some image-quality cues (discussed later)
such as the presence of Moire´ patterns. A recent work [6]
attempts to detect involuntary movements using dynamic mode
decomposition (DMD) of optical flow to characterize genuine
presentations. While not attempting to capture high-level cues
directly, this method can detect eye-blinks and lip movements
in a face-video [6].
Texture based face-PAD methods characterize the texture
information present in the face-region, using, for example,
local-binary patterns (LBP), derivatives of Gaussians (DoG),
and histograms of oriented gradients (HoG) descriptors [8],
[16]. Such methods can produce a decision after processing
only one frame of video and are, therefore, favored in systems
where fast authentication-response is important. Texture based
face-PAD has also been extended to the temporal domain [13],
where the LBP-histograms, traditionally computed only in the
X-Y plane, have been augmented with LBPs computed in the
X-T and the Y-T planes as well (here X and Y are the spatial
dimensions, and T is the temporal dimension).
Another approach to face-PAD is the analysis of image-
quality. For a face-recognition system, a PA often consists
in replaying, to the camera, a video of an enrolled person
whose identity is being spoofed. The process of re-capture
and playback typically introduces distortions in the video-data
that would not be seen in a live data-capture.
Galbally et al. have proposed a set of 25 image-quality
measures (IQM) [5], well known in the image-compression
community, to detect PAs. Wen et al. [17] have proposed a
different set of image-quality features, that attempt to char-
acterize color-diversity, image-sharpness, and the amount of
specularity present in the image. Whereas the IQMs used in
[5] are computed on gray-images (the Y component of a color-
frame in YCbCr representation), the features proposed in [17]
are evaluated on color-images (except for the image-sharpness
features).
Videos re-captured from a digital display device often
exhibit Moire´ patterns. Several researchers have used Moire´
pattern detectors [9], [18], [19] for face-PAD. Zhang et al.
[9] have proposed a Moire´ pattern detector based a two-class
classifier to detect the presence of high-frequency components
in the image. Garcia et al. [18] use a set of Mexican-Hat
filters to decompose the image. They then assume that a Moire´
pattern is present if the energy in any of the filter-responses is
stronger than a threshold. Patel et al. use multi-scale LBP, to
detect Moire´ patterns in the spatial domain. Overall, however,
these methods have limited success in face-PAD, since Moire´
patterns are not guaranteed to be present in all PAs. One
efficient way to use a Moire´ pattern detector is as a pre-filtering
step.
B. Existing Face-PAD Databases
The REPLAY-ATTACK face spoofing database [8] includes
1, 300 videos from 50 subjects. Of these, 100 genuine videos
are used for enrollment data for face-verification experiments.
The remaining 1, 200 are divided into three non-overlapping
subsets. These subsets constitute a protocol for unbiased
training, tuning and testing of new algorithms. The genuine-
access videos have been captured in two different lighting
conditions. Three types of spoofing attacks are included:
printed photographs, digital photographs and digital-video
replays. The main problem of REPLAY-ATTACK, regarding
face authentication on mobile devices, is the presentation and
recording technology used. The database was published in
2012 and the videos were recorded by using a 13′′ Macbook
at 320×240 resolution, which is very low by current standards
of mobile devices.
The CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database [9] contains
videos of about 10 seconds each, for genuine accesses and
attacks from 50 different users. This database has been col-
lected using two different devices: a VGA resolution webcam
(640 × 480) and a high resolution Sony NEX-5 camera
(1920 × 1080). The database does include high resolution
videos, but since they were not collected with mobile devices,
they are not representative of the mobile scenario: high distor-
tion frontal cameras, video compression, the user holding the
mobile device, changing backgrounds and illumination, and so
on.
The public version of the MSU-MFSD database [17] in-
cludes real-access and attack videos for 35 subjects. Real-
access videos (on average 12 sec. long) have been captured
using two devices: a 13′′ MacBook Air (using its built-
in camera), and a Google Nexus 5 (Android 4.4.2) phone.
Videos captured using the laptop camera have a resolution of
640×480, and those captured using the Android camera have
a resolution of 720 × 480. Three kinds of spoof-attacks are
included in the database: printed photo attacks, video replays
on a smartphone (iPhone 5s), and high-definition (HD) video-
replays (captured on a Canon 550D SLR, and played back
on an iPad Air). In total, the public version of MSU-MFSD
provides 70 real-access videos and 280 attack videos.
Learning-based PAD methods tend to depend strongly on
the dataset used for training. The robustness of a PAD method
depends on the training and evaluation dataset used, as well as
on the technology used for face presentation and acquisition.
This leads to the question: can we fairly evaluate the perfor-
mance face-PAD method designed for use on mobile devices,
without mobile-specific databases? This question motivates the
REPLAY-MOBILE database presented in this work.
III. THE REPLAY-MOBILE DATABASE
The REPLAY-MOBILE database5 consists of short video
recordings of both real-access and attack attempts to 40
different identities. This section presents the details of the data-
collection process, as well as an explanation of the evaluation
protocols that are provided.
A. Data Collection Set-up
The videos comprising this database have been collected in
two sessions separated by an interval of two weeks. In the first
session both enrollment videos and media for manufacturing
the attacks were collected under two different illumination
conditions, namely lighton (electric lights in the room are
switched on) and lightoff (electric lights are turned off). In
both scenarios the background of the scene is homogeneous
and a tripod is used for the capturing device. (More details
are provided in Section III-B.
In the second session each client recorded 10 videos, under
the following 5 different scenarios and paying special attention
to the lightning conditions:
1) controlled: the background of the scene is uniform, the
light in the office is switched on and the window blinds
are down.
2) adverse: the background of the scene is uniform, the
light in the office is switched off and the window blinds
are halfway up.
3) direct: the background of the scene is complex and
the user is facing a window with direct sunlight while
capturing the video.
5The database may be downloaded using the following URL:
https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replay-mobile
4) lateral: the background of the scene is complex and the
user is near to a window and receiving lateral sunlight
while capturing the video.
5) diffuse: the video is captured in an open hall with a
complex background and diffuse illumination.
When recording the video, the user was asked to stand, to
hold the mobile device at the eye level and to center the face
on the screen of the video capture application. Each video
is approximately 10 seconds long (∼ 300 frames @ 30fps)
and HD resolution (720 × 1280). (Note that the videos in
the MSU-MFSD database have relatively lower resolution.)
In each lighting condition the user captured two videos, one
using an iPad Mini 26 tablet and another using a LG-G47
smartphone.
Fig. 1: Examples of real accesses in different scenarios. Top
row: samples from real accesses captured on a smartphone.
Bottom row: samples captured on a tablet. Columns from left
to right show examples of video frames in controlled, adverse,
direct, lateral, and diffuse scenarios, respectively.
B. Generation of Attacks
To create the attacks, a separate set of high resolution photos
and videos were first collected, under the same illumination
conditions as described above. Each user was asked to sit down
in front of two devices while the acquisition operator captured
the data under the conditions previusly defined (lighton and
lightoff ). For photo-based attacks, a Nikon Coolpix P520 cam-
era was used to capture high resolution images (18 Mpixel).
Video-based attacks were recorded by using the back camera
of the LG-G4 smartphone, which records 1080p FullHD video
clips.
The attacks have been created using two different PAIs:
mattescreen: photos and videos for each client are displayed
on a Philips 227ELH monitor with a resolution of 1920×1080
6iPad Mini 2 is an iOS tablet produced and marketed by Apple Inc. This
tablet includes a 5 megapixel rear-facing camera and a 1.2 MP FaceTime HD
front-facing camera.
7LG G4 is an Android smartphone developed by LG Electronics. The rear-
facing camera has a 16 megapixel sensor with a f/1.8 aperture lens, infrared
active autofocus, three-axis optical image stabilization, and LED flash.
pixels; and print: hard-copies of high-resolution digital pho-
tographs are printed on plain A4 matte paper (using a Konica
Minolta ineo+ 224e color laser printer).
Each attack was recorded on each mobile device (tablet and
smartphone) for 10 seconds. For recording mattescreen attacks
the capturing mobile device was supported on a fixed support.
Each print video, however, was captured in two different attack
modes: hand-held attack, where the operator holds the capture
device; and fixed-support attack, where the capture device is
fixed on a supportThus, four different PAIs are represented
in REPLAY-MOBILE. Figure 2 shows examples of attacks
available in the database.
Fig. 2: Samples of the different presentations attack instru-
ments (PAI). Top row: samples from attack accesses captured
on a smartphone. Bottom row: samples captured on a tablet.
Columns, from left to right, show examples of mattescreen-
lighton, mattescreen-lightoff, print-lighton, and print-lightoff,
respectively.
C. Evaluation Protocols
To simplify its use and adoption, this new database is de-
signed following the structure of REPLAY-ATTACK database
[8]. Videos in the REPLAY-MOBILE database are grouped
into 3 subsets: train, development and test. The three subsets
have no overlap. Identities for each subset have been selected
via demographic analysis: each subset has equable distribution
for identities based on gender, age and eye-wear.
The REPLAY-MOBILE database also provides an enroll set,
consisting of 160 videos, corresponding to enrollment data for
each of the 40 clients. Specifically, four enrollment videos are
available for each client, corresponding to videos recorded in
two different illumination conditions (lighton and lightoff ), on
each of the two mobile devices.
Table I summarizes the organization of videos in the various
protocols for face-PAD experiments. Each row in the table
(a specific Scenario-Type pair) corresponds to one PAI. The
column-labels Mobile and Tablet indicate the capture-device
used. Besides the two protocols (mattescreen and print), a
Grandtest protocol is also provided, for global performance
evaluation8.
mattescreen
attack
print
attack
Grandtest
attack
real
access
photo
fixed
print
fixed
print
hand
Mobile
Train 60 24 24 24 156
Devel 80 32 32 32 208
Test 60 24 24 24 156
Tablet
Train 60 24 24 24 156
Devel 80 32 32 32 208
Test 60 24 24 24 156
Total 400 160 160 160 1040
TABLE I: Number of videos in each database subset.
IV. THE STUDIED FACE-PAD APPROACHES
In this section we describe the two face-PAD methods that
we have applied to the REPLAY-MOBILE database. The first
method, described in Section IV-A, is based on image-quality
measures, and serves as our baseline. In Section IV-B we
propose a new method for face-PAD, based on Gabor-jets.
Experimental results for these methods are reported in Section
V.
A. Face-PAD Based on Image Quality
Our baseline, against which to compare the results of the
proposed method, is derived from a set of image-quality
measures (IQM), first used for face-PAD by Galbally et al.
[5]. Some of the IQMs used by Galbally et al. [5], have
been computed using third-party executables and are not
easily reproducible. Our experiments are based a subset of
reproducible features. Specifically, from the set of 25 IQMs
proposed by Galbally et al. [5], we have used a subset of 18
IQMs. The features used in our experiments are listed in Table
II. For each frame of video, these features are computed over
the entire frame, not just the face-region.
B. Face-PAD Using Gabor-Jets
LBP texture descriptors have been successfully used for
face-PAD [20]. Here we propose a new texture-based approach
for face-PAD, using Gabor-jets. GRADIANT [21] have pre-
viously used Gabor-jets [22], [23] as a feature-extraction step
for face-recognition. To our knowledge this texture-descriptor
has not previously been applied to the problem of face-PAD.
We compute Gabor-jets over a regular 10 × 10 grid using
40 Gabor wavelets with default parametrization [22]. After
aligning the face images to 85 × 100 pixels, an adaptation
of the retina layer model [24] is used to preprocess them.
The computed feature vectors only apply to face region, using
bounding boxes computed using a face-detection preprocessor.
If the face detector does not detect any face in a given frame of
8In Table I, each element in the Grandtest column is the sum of the
remaining elements in the corresponding row.
F# Name Abbrev.
1 Mean Squared Error MSE
2 Peak Signal to Noise Ratio PSNR
3 Average difference AD
4 Structural content SC
5 Normalized cross-correlation NK
6 Max. difference MD
7 Laplacian MSE LMSE
8 Normalized Abs. error NAE
9 Signal to noise ratio SNRv
10 R-averaged Max. difference (r=10) RAMDv
11 Mean angle similarity MAS
12 Mean angle magnitude similarity MAMS
13 Spectral magnitude error SME
14 Gradient magnitude error GME
15 Gradient phase error GPE
16 Structural similarity index SSIM
17 Visual information fidelity VIF
18 High-low frequency index HLFI
TABLE II: List of image-quality measures (IQM) used in the
baseline experiments. The use of these measures as features
for face-PAD has been proposed by Galbally et al. [5]. The
feature-names and abbreviations listed here are those used in
[5], where full descriptions of the measures, specifically, their
mathematical definitions, can be found.
the input video, that frame is discarded from further analysis.
For each face-image a 4000-element feature-vector is recorded.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Experimental results for the two face-PAD approaches dis-
cussed in Section IV are presented here. To evaluate the
PAD performance, we have elected to use standard ISO/IEC
30107-3 metrics, namely, APCER: Attack Presentation Clas-
sification Error Rate; and BPCER: Bona fide Presentation
Classification Error Rate. APCER and BPCER and analogous
to the commonly used false (spoof) acceptance rate (FAR),
and false (genuine) rejection rate (FRR), respectively. The
main difference between the standardized measures and the old
measures is that in APCER and BPCER, the attack-potential
and the probability of success of each attack type is also taken
into account. We also provide the ACER (Average Classifi-
cation Error Rate), defined as (APCER + BPCER)/2, to
summarize the overall performance PAD algorithm as a single
number. The lower the ACER values the better is the perfor-
mance. To aid comparison with previously published works,
however, we also report the half-total error rates (HTER) for
our experiments. In all experiments, the performance has been
computed on a ’per-frame basis’.
A. Face-PAD Based on Image Quality
Galbally et al. [5] have used linear discriminant analysis
(LDA) in their experiments, to achieve a HTER of 15.2% on
the REPLAY-ATTACK database (for the Grandtest protocol).
Our experiments show that a support-vector machine (SVM)
with a radial-basis function (RBF) kernel yields better face-
PAD results than LDA (using the same features). The results of
our experiments are summarized in Table III, which presents
the HTER performance of the two classifiers (LDA, and SVM-
RBF) on the REPLAY-ATTACK database. The table reports
the achieved percent error-rates on the development set (EER,
the equal-error rate) and the test set (HTER), for the Grandtest
protocol of the REPLAY-ATTACK database9.
Galbally et al. [5] LDA SVM-RBF
Dev. EER (%) 5.06 2.68
Test. HTER (%) 15.20 9.78 5.28
TABLE III: Comparison of different classifiers for the face-
PAD Grandtest protocol of the REPLAY-ATTACK database.
For SVM, we have used the publicly available, LIBSVM
implementation, and have set the kernel parameter γ = 1.5.
(See Table II for the list of features used in our baseline
experiments.) The EER and HTER values presented here have
been computed on a ’per-frame’ basis.
For baseline experiments on the REPLAY-MOBILE
database, in Table IV we report results using only the SVM-
RBF classifier. The table reports the EER for the development
set, and the HTER achieved on the test set, for different
combinations of scenario and type defined in the REPLAY-
MOBILE database. The overall performance, as shown for
the experiment [Grandtest] in Table IV, is 7.8%10. We use
this method to set our face-PAD baseline on this database.
Mattescreen Print
Grandtest
photo video fixed hand
Dev. EER (%) 7.93 11.70 5.31 4.98 7.50
Test. HTER (%) 7.70 13.64 4.22 5.43 7.80
TABLE IV: Baseline results using SVM-RBF classifier (γ =
1.5) on IQM features (see Table II) computed for the face-PAD
protocol of the REPLAY-MOBILE database.
B. Face-PAD Using Gabor-Jets
A two-class classifier is constructed for the 4000-D Gabor-
jet feature-vectors using SVM-RBF (γ = 1#features =
0.00025). The classification results achieved on REPLAY-
MOBILE and the comparison with the IQM baseline are
shown in Table V.
From Table V we can also observe the advantage of using
the performance measures APCER and BPCER, over HTER.
Using HTER one may conclude that both methods (IQM-
based and Gabor-based face-PAD) achieve similar results.
Using APCER and BPCER, however, we can observe the
9Preliminary experiments using principal component analysis (PCA) to
reduce the dimensionality of the feature-space showed poorer results than
when the 18 IQM features are used directly for classification.
10The fact that the classification performance on the REPLAY-MOBILE
database is worse than on the REPLAY-ATTACK database, is in line with
expectations. We attribute this difference in performance to the fact that attack-
videos in the REPLAY-MOBILE database have been constructed using higher
quality PAIs than those used for the older, REPLAY-ATTACK database.
Test.
HTER (%)
Test.
ACER
(%)
Test.
APCER
(%)
Test.
BPCER
(%)MP MV PF PH GT
IQM 7.70 13.64 4.22 5.43 7.80 13.64 19.87 7.40
Gabor 8.64 9.53 9.40 8.99 9.13 9.53 7.91 11.15
TABLE V: HTER, ACER, APCER, BPCER (%) of the
proposed method compared with the baseline in REPLAY-
MOBILE database. The HTER results are reported for each
protocol, indicated by the following column-headings: MP –
mattescreen-photo, MV – mattescreen-video, PF – print-fixed,
PH – print-hand and GT – Grandtest.
Gabor-based approach seems more consistent among different
presentation attack instruments (PAI), which indicates that it
is the more robust of the two approaches.
The detection-error tradeoff (DET) curves in Figure 3 show
the influence of each attack. These plots illustrate the fact that
the Gabor-jet based face-PAD shows consistent performance
for the different kinds of attacks, whereas the performance of
the image-quality based approach varies significantly among
the various attack-types.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The need for robust countermeasures against presentation
attacks remains a significant challenge for the adoption of
facial authentication technology on mobile devices. For a
effective evaluation of face-PAD methods, new datasets should
be generated to reflect realistic testing scenarios. We have
reviewed the main limitations of current databases for evalu-
ating face-PAD methods intended to work on mobile devices.
Taking into account these requirements, we have proposed
REPLAY-MOBILE, a new database for fair evaluation of face-
PAD methods on mobile devices. The key characteristics of
REPLAY-MOBILE are:
1) high-resolution videos captured under realistic condi-
tions of device-usage, including a variety of illumination
conditions;
2) a variety of presentation-attacks, including high quality
prints on matte-paper and matte-screen videos;
3) a pre-defined protocol for unbiased training and fair
evaluation.
Using REPLAY-MOBILE, we have established a bench-
mark and baseline for the evaluation of face-PAD by using
the newly standardized metrics, APCER and BPCER, defined
in the ISO/IEC CD 30107-3 standard. We have also compared
the performance of two different face-PAD approaches, one
based on image quality assessment and one based on texture
analysis (Gabor-jets). The comparison made between the two
approaches show the benefits of using these metrics for a more
fair evaluation of anti-spoofing algorithms.
The database will be made publicly available in order to
help the development and fair evaluation of anti-spoofing
algorithms for face authentication on mobile devices.
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Fig. 3: DET curves for the various attack protocols. The per-
formance of the IQM based PAD method varies significantly
among the different kinds of attacks. By contrast, the Gabor-jet
based approach is more consistent over the range of attack-
types.
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